174 / 298
Horst Steinke
174
of simple truths» (V. Peckhaus,
Calculus Ratiocinator vs. Characteristica Universal-
is?
, cit., p. 182).
330
J. Hintikka,
Lingua universalis
, cit., p. 5.
331
Hintikka refers to it as «the possibility of
re
-interpreting language as
freely as interpreting [associating it to a scenario, actual or hypothetical] an
uninterpreted calculus» (
ibidem
).
332
S. Knuuttila,
Hintikka’s View of the History of Philosophy
, cit., p. 99; Hin-
tikka put it more quaintly (in terms of a (bygone) historical socioeconomic
setting): «[…] we are not tied to our language. Our language is our servant, we
are its masters. We can tell it what to do, and we are not committed to its do-
ing what it does in one way only. We can hire another one if one old language
does not serve us satisfactorily» (Id.,
Lingua universalis
, cit., p. 22).
333
Knuutttila (following Hintikka) illustrates this state of affairs by means
of Cubism: first of all, Cubism “stepped outside” thinking in terms of merely
finding a different visual (both pictorial and plastic) mode of representation of
reality, and re-thought, and re-discussed, the relation itself between represen-
tation and reality, thus making the language of art itself the object of language.
One of the concrete ways – but by no means the only one
–
this turned into
was a “model-theoretic” conception of perspective, that is, perspective itself
became an object of meta-discourse (Id.,
Hintikka’s Ideas About the History of
Ideas
, cit., pp. 118-119). For a multi-faceted discussion of Cubism in this con-
text, see J. Hintikka,
The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modal-
ity
, Dordrecht-Boston, D. Reidel, 1975, pp. 223-251. For example, Hintikka’s
comments on Braque’s collages as confounding the relations between art and
reality, in effect, creating alternative (small-scale) “models” of reality (
ibid.
, p.
246). A similar observation is made by M. Piccolomini: «While they were chal-
lenging traditional art, they also challenged the meaning of art itself» (Id.,
Vico,
Sorel, and Modern Artistic Primitivism
, cit., pp. 123-130, p. 129).
334
When it comes to discussing philosophy of language, canonicity in-
volves inclusion of Wittgenstein in any discussion, regardless of whether it is
in a Vichian context or not. The former has been undertaken in E. Riverso,
Vico and Wittgenstein
, in
Giambattista Vico’s Science of Humanity
,
cit., pp. 263-273.
Riverso considers as the main commonality between the two thinkers, their
«reaction against abstract rationalism» (
ibid.
, pp. 264, 273). And, as noted
above, both would concur on rejecting the notion of calculus when it is un-
derstood as a purely formal(istic) operation. Other possible points of contact
between Vico and Wittgenstein are touched on in B. A. Haddock,
Vico and the
Problem of Historical Reconstruction
, in
Vico and Contemporary Thought
, cit., Part 1,
pp. 122-129, p. 128, and Id.,
Vico: The Problem of Interpretation
,
ibid.
, pp. 145-
162, p. 153. Of further interest is Riverso’s characterization of the essence of