171 / 298
Vico’s Ring
171
313
It should be noted in passing that this “leap” is not presented in terms
of human cultural achievements in a general sense, such as the belleslettres,
the fine arts, social mores/customs, science, technology and other forms of
material culture, but rather in terms of the search for (relative) equity under
law, and liberty (§ 415), which is consistent with Vico’s unvarying view of the
latter as conditions of possibility of all culture.
314
To use the term coined (in a different context) by D. L. Marshall,
Vico
and the Transformation of Rhetoric in Early Modern Europe,
New York, Cambridge
University Press, 2010, including the topically relevant observations: «Beyond
its status as cognitive achievements, however, Vico’s poetic wisdom is a pri-
mary mode of connection between persons» (
ibid.
, p. 217).
315
For instance, in L. Formigari,
Signs, Science and Politics
,
cit., p. 81: «[…]
we must view Vico’s philosophy as anticipating that turning point in modern
linguistic theory at which language is granted precedence over thought, and is
seen as a tool for organising knowledge»; Id.,
A History of Language Philosophies
,
cit., p. 189: «Two fairly distinct […] approaches will be examined […]: one
deals with language as an instrument of cognitive interaction […]».
316
For example, in L. Formigari,
Introduzione alla filosofia delle lingue
, cit., p.
19: «Nella moderna linguistica cognitiva la nozione del linguaggio come stru-
mento si accompagna spesso all’immagine della mente come dispositivo di
calculo (In modern cognitive linguistics, the notion of language as tool is of-
ten associated to the concept of the mind as a computational apparatus (calcu-
lus))». As Formigari subsequently explains, «calculo» in this context does not
refer to mathematics but to software-like mental operations on, and with, lin-
guistic elements.
317
See C. Muscelli,
Il segno di Giove. Essere, storia e linguaggio nella
Scienza
nuova
di Vico
, in «MLN», 120, 2005, pp. 93-110; Muscelli, in fact, goes a step
further, and relates Vico and Wittgenstein: «In effetti, è facile notare come
Wittgenstein e Vico siano vicini in questa prospettiva: connotando antropolo-
gicamente la sua riflessione, il filosofo delle
Ricerche filosofiche
giunge ad una
teoria del linguaggio che non è più calcolo ma espressione de una “forma di
vita” (In effect, it is easy to note how Wittgenstein’s and Vico’s perspectives
are close: by giving his reflections an anthropological connotation, the philo-
sopher of the
Philosophical Investigations
arrives at a theory of language which is
not calculus any more but an expression of a “form of life”)» (
ibid.
, p. 105).
318
This is argued in D. Di Cesare,
Parola, logos, dabar
, cit., p. 259: «Principio
insieme constitutivo e interpretativo del “mondo civile”, il linguaggio non è
parte, per quanto essenziale, di questo mondo, non è istituzione accanto ad
altre istituzioni. Il rischio maggiore di concepirlo così è quello di intenderlo in
modo strumentale e non autonomo (As both constitutive and interpretative