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Horst Steinke

180

Spinoza

, pp. 73-100 (originally published in 1969), and G. Fløistad,

Spinoza’s

Theory of Knowledge in the Ethics,

pp. 101-127 (originally published in 1969). We

will refer to these contributions simply as Savan, Parkinson, and Fløistad, re-

spectively.

359

«The imaginative, general, and confused character of words is, in Spi-

noza’s view, not contingent or accidental, it is not the result of ignorance and

cannot be eliminated by knowledge. It is rather the necessary consequence of

the action of external bodies upon our body» (Savan, p. 62).

360

On

substance, properties of substance, modes

(

ibid.

, pp. 64-66).

361

Ibid.

, p. 71.

362

Parkinson, p. 91: «What he [Spinoza] objects to […] is not the use of

words as such, but the uncritical acceptance of common usage as a guide in

philosophy».

363

Ibid.

, p. 95: «One may indeed be tempted to suppose that the whole of

the

Ethics

is an expression in verbal form of knowledge of the second kind».

364

Ethics

, Proposition XL, Note II, as quoted above.

365

Parkinson, p. 95: «In sum, reason is regarded by Spinoza as deductive

knowledge, having as its basis propositions which every man must accept. […]

It is clear that much of what is said in the

Ethics

is of this type [so called “no-

tions” about “things which are common to all”]».

366

Ibid.

, p. 99-100.

367

Fløistad, p. 111; Fløistad, at the same time, makes a case,

pace

Parkin-

son, for the presence not merely of a few examples of intuitive knowledge in

Ethics

, but for its pivotal role (

ibid.

, pp. 123-127).

368

Ibid.

, p. 124: «a process of knowing in which the mind finally comes to

know (“intuit”) the unity of thought and extension».

369

Ibid.

, pp. 111-112: «Whether or not language may adequately express

knowledge by imagination [the first kind], reason [the second kind], and intui-

tion [the third kind] depends not only on language, […] but also on the kind

of knowledge or way of knowing things which one is exercising or is able to

exercise».

370

Using the term very loosely and not intending to imply gradualism

from the first to the third kind of knowledge.

371

Both Parkinson and Fløistad take issue with Savan’s claims of «contra-

dictions”, and Fløistad observes that «[t]o decide exactly where incoherences

in fact lie is notoriously difficult» (

ibid.

, p. 103).

372

Fløistad, p. 101.

373

Parkinson, p. 93: «[…] the fact that Spinoza makes no attempt to ex-

plain how words can convey true ideas is a strong argument against the thesis