179 / 298
Vico’s Ring
179
kinds of knowledge, in other words, by assuming that each kind has strict, not
to say rigid, boundaries. Lack of clarification of presuppositions regarding
kindhood in Spinoza can have significant exegetical consequences. For in-
stance, I. Franck can say first, «[o]f course, Spinoza endeavors to keep clear
and sharp the distinction between
Imaginatio
and
Intellectus
(or
scientia intuitiva
,
i.e. the third kind of knowledge)», but then can also assert «that for Spinoza
the distinctions between the three kinds of knowledge “are of a relative rather
than absolute character”» (Id.,
Spinoza’s Logic of Inquiry: Rationalist or Experien-
tialist?
, in
The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza
, cit., pp. 247-272, pp. 270-271 [quot-
ing De Deugd]). As a result, neglecting to address and examine kindhood pre-
vents the consideration of alternative paradigms of conceiving the relation-
ships among the three kinds of knowledge that may not entail blurring the
lines between them.
349
Ethics
, Part I, Proposition VIII, Note II.
350
Ibid.
, Part I, Proposition XXXIII, Note II.
351
Ibid.
, Part II, Proposition XLVII, Note.
352
Ibid.
, Part II, Proposition XLIX, Note.
353
Ibid.
, Part IV, Preface.
354
See also
Letter 21.
Spinoza has much more to say about the language of
the «prophets» in the
Theological-Political Treatise
, especially in Chapters 1 and 2;
in our context, a statement in Chapter 4 is particularly relevant, where he
compares the «prophets» with «Christ» in terms of the first and third kind of
knowledge: «For it is when a thing is perceived by pure thought, without
words or images, that it is understood» (B. Spinoza,
Theological-Political Treatise
(
Gebhardt Edition
),
Second Edition,
trans. by S. Shirley, intro. and annotation
by S. Feldmann, Indianapolis-Cambridge, Hackett Publishing, 2001, p. 54;
henceforth referred to as
TTP
, followed by chapter number, and page number
in the Shirley translation). The context is Spinoza’s critique of the Bible, and
so it serves as a special case of the inadequacy of language.
355
Quoted from
The Essential Spinoza
, cit.
356
TdIE
, §§ 88, 89.
357
A. V. Garrett,
Meaning in Spinoza’s Method
, cit., p. 17.
358
In 2003, Garrett noted: «Spinoza’s deep suspicion of language seems to
preclude the
Ethics
being anything but the first kind of knowledge» (
ibid.
, p.
17); almost half a century earlier, D. Savan argued «that Spinoza’s views on
words and language make it impossible for him to hold that his writings (or
anyone else’s) can be a direct or literal exposition of philosophical truths», in a
1955 paper, reprinted as
Spinoza and Language
, in M. Grene (ed. by),
Spinoza: A
Collection of Critical Essays
, cit., pp. 60-72, pp. 60-61. The same volume contains
two dissenting responses, i.e., G. H. R. Parkinson,
Language and Knowledge in