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Horst Steinke
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guage other than (his own) «language of philosophy»: «[…] while
we are speaking philosophically, we ought not to use the lan-
guage of theology […] these and similar words have no place,
and we cannot use them without utterly confusing our concepts».
Turning now to
TdIE
(
Treatise on the Emendation of the Intel-
lect
)
355
, Spinoza elaborates on his reasons for considering imagi-
nation and language («words») as belonging together in the first
kind of knowledge:
Then again, since words are a part of the imagination – that is, since
many of our concepts are formed according to the haphazard compo-
sition of words in memory from some disposition of the body – there
can be no doubt that words no less than imagination can bring about
many grave errors unless we exercise great caution in that respect. Add
to this that words owe their formation to the whim and understanding
of the common people, so that they are merely symbols of things as
they are in the imagination, not in the intellect
356
.
It is no wonder that students of Spinoza felt justified in
speaking of «Spinoza’s deep suspicion of language»
357
. At first
glance, this considers Spinoza’s view as a matter of propositional
attitude, or, expressed differently, viewing the inclusion of lan-
guage in the first kind of knowledge as resulting from such «sus-
picious» attitude; the alternative perspective is to reverse cause-
and-effect in this case, that is, understanding his attitude, not as
cause but rather as the result of language, ontologically, being in-
tegrally associated with the lowest form of knowledge. This latter
approach also would be more in harmony with what we would
expect from someone who is to be counted among the great sys-
tematic thinkers. More significant, however, is a question or
problematic that follows from Spinoza’s positioning of language:
if language belongs to the first kind of knowledge, how could
language possibly be capable of expressing the higher kinds of
knowledge? This issue has preoccupied Spinoza studies for dec-
ades
358
. This question is not the same as asking whether Spinoza