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Vico’s Ring

155

out errors on the part of dissenting speakers; in other words, it is

not just the substantive views that are critiqued, but indirectly

language itself by association. It shows up in locutions such as:

for a person to say that […]; if anyone affirmed […]; would be the

same as saying that a false idea was true […]

349

; [b]ut, it is said, suppos-

ing that […] But persons who say this must admit that […] But it will

be said, there is […] What is such an assertion, but […] the height of

absurdity

350

; we do not apply names to things rightly […] men do not

rightly explain their meanings or do not rightly interpret the meaning

of others

351

; [i]t is further necessary that they should distinguish be-

tween ideas and words, […] These three – namely, images, words, and

ideas – are by many persons either entirely confused together, or not

distinguisged with sufficient accuracy and care […] The essence of

words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no wise

involve the conception of thought

352

; they say that Nature has fallen

short […] from their own prejudices […] of what they pronounce up-

on […]. As for the terms

good

and

bad,

they

,

[…] are merely modes of

thinking […], useful for us to retain […] in the sense I have indicated

353

.

In the more freewheeling, less guarded, setting of personal

correspondence, Spinoza’s attitude toward language finds more

explicit expression. In

Letter 17

, in order to illustrate imagination,

he compares it to dreaming and the vivid images that appear in

dreams, but, significantly, for our point of view, describes it as

«linking together and interconnecting its images and

words

» (Ital-

ics added). This is consistent with how he had defined the scope

of the first kind of knowledge as including body-bound imagina-

tion and language. In

Letter 19

he refers to «speaking improperly

or in merely human fashion», adding that «Scripture, […]

adapted to […] the common people, continually speaks in merely

human fashion, for the common people are incapable of under-

standing higher things», and that the «Prophets […] made up a

whole parable, […] constantly depicted God in human form;

[…] [s]o philosophers […] should not find such words a stum-

bling block»

354

; in

Letter 23

, Spinoza further repudiates all lan-