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Vico’s Ring

153

the human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a

certain number of images within itself at the same time; […] the imag-

es will begin to be confused; […] all will become entirely confused one

with another. […] When the images become quite confused in the

body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinc-

tion, and will comprehend them, as it were, under one arttribute,

namely under the attribute of Being, Thing, &c. [terms styled

transcen-

dental

]. […] All may be reduced to this, that these terms represent ideas

in the highest degree confused. From similar causes arise those no-

tions, which we call

general,

such as man, horse, dog, & c.

In order to contrast the first kind of knowledge with the sec-

ond and third kinds, it is heuristically helpful to “leapfrog” di-

rectly to the third kind for which Spinoza reserves the special

term «intuitive knowledge (

scientia intuitiva

340

. It is no exaggera-

tion to say that the core of Spinoza’s philosophy is encapsulated

in “intuitive knowledge”, a body of knowledge that is not intui-

tive in a psychological sense, at least not primarlily so, but “intu-

iting”, possessing the deepest kind of insight and comprehension

of the very essence and nature of reality in all its manifesta-

tions

341

which, for Spinoza, meant the one substance (sometimes

paraphrased by commentators as “God-Nature”

sans

a transcen-

dental God), all else being merely

attributes

or

modes

of the sub-

stance, including especially the human mind. This third kind of

knowledge is therefore the depository of pure thought and true

ideas in a strict sense, produced by an unencumbered mind, un-

sullied by images formed by the body

342

.

The second kind of knowledge is the province of

reason

, en-

compassing general reasoning

ability, but especially scientific rea-

soning and methodology. Whereas the first kind of knowledge is

entirely contingent and unsystematic, reason is able to discern

what is invariant and not subject to vicissitudes

343

. Although Spi-

noza did not engage in scientific work extensively, his corre-

spondence

344

bears testimony to his keen interest in scientific re-

search, not shying away from performing actual experiments.