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Vico’s Ring

151

“model(s)”, and even of discussion at the next higher level, the

variation in alternative (representational) relations

333

.

By referring to the notion of language as “universal medium”

as «an ultimate presupposition of twentieth-century philoso-

phy»

334

, the issue of anachronism presents itself anew, this time

with reference to Vico’s philosophy of language. It is therefore

important to look back to the early modern age with this prob-

lematic in mind. Although the historiography of language philos-

ophies typically does not include this criterion in its expositions,

evidence is not missing of the presence of these presupposi-

tions

335

. And of more than ordinary interest and relevance are the

ideas of Spinoza with respect to language, in themselves, but also

for the purpose of juxtaposing them to Vico’s treatment of, and

attitude toward, language, thus putting us in a position to give

the Vichian view a more highly marked character, analogously to

the comparison/contrast between Spinoza and Vico explored

earlier in a different context.

Spinoza’s reflections and treatment of language are found in a

number of his works, but despite the very different “genres” and

contexts involved, they are consistent with each other, and com-

plement and elucidate each other, which is nothing less than one

would expect from «one of the greatest philosophers of the sev-

enteenth century, or of any time»

336

. The first observation to be

made is that Spinoza does not accord language an ontological

status of its own, or independently of any other entities of his

philosophical system. Rather, language makes its appearance as

an adjunct to, or within, his theory of knowledge which stipu-

lates a «first kind», a «second kind», and a «third kind» of

knowledge, arranged in ascending hierarchical order. Language,

denoted by Spinoza as «words», belongs to the first kind, stated

in a key text in

Ethics

, along with its fundamental differences with

the other two kinds of knowledge; although this is stated ex-

tremely succinctly, all the essential characteristics of each type of