148 / 298
Horst Steinke
148
above. The “tool” metaphor, and its allied “instrument” meta-
phor, seem to be a fixture in the study of language and linguis-
tics, and the resultant debates
315
. Tool and instrument, of course,
are by no means synonymous, but they significantly overlap in
meaning, specifically in terms of conveying the basic thought of
means or agency in contradistinction to subject or object. And,
for our purposes, we need to add the term “calculus”
316
as an-
other alternative designation by picking out of its complex con-
notations (semantic domains), the notion of method or system
of manipulation. By using these terms interchangeably or equiva-
lently, we are deliberately disregarding a variety of attributes that
underlie their individual semantics, such as the fact that proceed-
ing, conceptually, from tool to instrument to calculus, entails,
among other factors, recognition of increasing investment of in-
tellectual capital. In Vico’s case, there have been objections
raised, for various reasons, to interpreting his attitude toward
language as being a mere “tool”. It has been pointed out, for ex-
ample, that for Vico, social, communicative, and cognitive needs
always go together, and that it is impossible therefore to establish
any precedence of the process of making sense of the world, on
the one hand, over language, on the other hand
317
. A similar con-
clusion of the non-instrumental status of language – while com-
ing at the issue from a different direction – has been considered
an unavoidable consequence of recognizing the «autonomy» of
language in all human culture and activity
318
. The autonomous
status of language has also been asserted from a cognitive point
of view, in that language is considered to constitute itself a cer-
tain form of thinking rather than merely an external expression
of thought or its instrument
319
.
This brief selection of views on the privileged place which Vi-
co accorded to language in his philosophy shows remarkable
agreement, albeit of a negative kind, on one point, namely, that
language is not a tool, an instrument, or a calculus. It is remarka-
ble in view of the fact that the same conclusion is reached from