112 / 298
Horst Steinke
112
on the one hand, it be premetaphorical and preconceptual in a way that de-
prives it of any determinateness which could point forward in any one par-
ticular direction of historical development rather than in some other alterna-
tive direction; but he also requires of it that it be sufficiently determinate to
function as the specific precursor of what actually occurred in the unfolding
of what he took, not always correctly, to be actual history». (A. Macintyre,
Im-
aginative Universals and Historical Falsification: A Rejoinder to Professor Verene
, in
«NVS», 6 (1988), pp. 21-30, p. 29) These comments identify two spheres,
“philosophy”, the realm of imaginative universals, preconceptual thinking,
and the sphere of actual history, but omit “philology”, which is the sphere
that is, epistemically, «the precursor of what actually occurred in […] history»,
rather than “philosophy”. With this modification, the perceived incoherence
disappears.
The failure of making the intermediary function of “philology” explicit,
and thus conflating “philology” (the ideal eternal history) and “philosophy”
(the metaphysical), seems also to be behind the problems that L. Pompa more
recently saw in Vico’s explanations: «And so, in turn must the ideal eternal
history [be rejected], understood as a metaphysical pattern underlying and de-
termining the outline and shape of human history. Hence, in effect, Vico’s
attempt to present empirical history
sub specie aeternitatis
must be seen as a he-
roic but misguided vision» (Id.,
Reflections on the Ideal Eternal History
, in «BCSV»,
XLI, 2011, 2, pp. 15-32, p. 25).
202
Just by way of illustration, a modern, anachronistic, example is J. Rawls,
A Theory of Justice
, Cambridge, Mass. , Harvard University Press, 1971. A non-
anachronistic example would be, of course, Grotius’ theory of international
law.
203
Cristofolini captured aspects of this difference: «Il versante filologico è
più esplicito […]. Il procedimento filosofico, più implicito, è diverso, per non
dire opposto (The philological side is more explicit […]. The philosophical
procedure, more implicit, is different, not to say opposite)» (Id.,
La Scienza
nuova
di Vico
, cit., p. 96).
204
See
Philosophy
, Chapter 3, Introduction: «We have seen that human be-
ings know the principles of the sciences in God by means of the idea of eter-
nal order, and thus it follows that the principles of things themselves are from
God. […] He is truth». Also Chapter 4, § 1: «Since God alone is true and truth
itself, […] we have confirmed that the cult of the one God, who is known by
the mind, is the true religion». Regardless of whether considered from this
perspective or the functorial point of view, the entities belonging to the “phil-
osophical” sphere do not arise
ex nihilo.
This is not unrelated (although this is
not the place to explore this point further) to M. Lollini’s disagreement with S.