114 / 298
Horst Steinke
114
differs from Spinoza in the sense that the Vichian ideas are modes of man and
not of God)» (Id.,
Vico. Storia, linguaggio, natura
, Rome, Edizioni di storia e let-
teratura, 2008, p. 110).
207
This is correctly asserted by U. Galeazzi,
Ermeneutica e storia in Vico. Mo-
rale, diritto e società nella “Scienza nuova
”, L’Aquila-Rome, Japadre, 1993, p. 35:
«Infatti [la metafisica della mente] procede dal’accertamento filologico, stori-
co-empirico dei fatti umani, che il soggetto conoscente, non produce […] (In
fact, [the metaphysics of the mind] begins, and continues with, the philologi-
cal, historical-empirical establishment of the man-made facts that the
knowledge-capable subject does not produce […])».
208
To quote Galeazzi again: «Un metodo unico che si adottasse
a priori
,
indipendentemente dalla peculiarità di ciò che è oggetto di indagine, sarebbe
di ostacolo all’impresa conoscitiva, pretendendo di predeterminare che cosa
debba essere la realtà che, invece, si tratta di scoprire (A single method adop-
ted
a priori
, independently of the specific nature of the object of inquiry,
would be an obstacle to the epistemic endeavor, presuming to predetermine
what should be the reality which, rather, is what is to be discovered)» (
ibid.
,
p.
42).
209
«Sicché la nuova scienza non procede deduttivamente dai principi agli
effetti, ma al contrario dai fatti si impegna a risalire ai principi (Thus the new
science does not proceed deductively from principles to effects, but to the
contrary, from the facts it strives to ascend to principles)» (
ibid.
,
p. 180).
210
This is succinctly elucidated by Schaeffer,
Vico’s Il diritto universale
and
Roman Law
, cit., pp. 45-62; relative to the argument we are developing at this
point
–
the “left-to-right” direction of forgetful functors, transitively from the
prevailing, real-life human situation to the articulation of certain legal stand-
ards, and ultimately to the ideal of equity
–
some of Schaeffer’s insights on
Vico are pertinent: «When society becomes sufficiently complex, tensions be-
tween established custom (the c
ertum
) and new situations and problems come
into play. At this point, says Vico, humans begin to seek the truth that lies
within or behind the certain. That truth is the last of Vico’s key terms: the
verum
. The truth that is sought is equity: how new situations can be accommo-
dated equitably. […] What has been established (
certum
) must become an ob-
ject of speculation; the principles implicated in custom must be exposed so
that they may be altered or reaffirmed in a new praxis or in a code. […] By
searching for its principles […] the lineaments of the natural law begin to ap-
pear. Hence the natural law is not deduced from reason but induced from his-
tory. […] Vico’s account of a historical development of Roman law has im-
portant implications. First, the law is not founded in some originating rational
act» (
ibid.
, pp. 50-51).