108 / 298
Horst Steinke
108
179
See the description of a mundane physical system in category-theoretic
terms in my
Vico’s Three Realms
, cit., pp. 73-74.
180
The potentially vast difference between these two kinds of functors is
evident in the physical illustration referred to above, in which the forgetful
functor was embodied in the
thermometer
whereas the contravariant functor
was made up by the far more massive and complex
heating/cooling system
.
181
Hösle raised the inevitable question whether Vico should be seen as an
empiricist or a rationalist, and comes down in favor of labeling Vico as the
latter (Id.,
Einleitung
, cit., pp. CXIII-CXVII, specifically p. CXIV, footnote
146).
182
The significance of the “
semi
contravariant” functor will be commented
on further below.
183
Hösle distinguished between two types of
a priori
,
i.e. between the «hy-
pothetical”, and its opposite or “dual”, the «apodictic»
a priori
. The apodictic
a
priori,
which is favored by Hösle in Vico’s case, is seen as possessing affinities
with Hegel’s philosophy of reality («Realphilosophie»). However, despite be-
ing arrived at in different cognitive ways, both kinds of
a priori
are in need of,
and depend on, confirmation and validation in the real (historical) world.
«Aber die begrifflichen Strukturen müssen
empirisch interpretiert
werden, weil sie
sich im Bereich der Realphilosophie aus begrifflichen Gründen empirisch
manifestieren müssen (But the conceptual structures must be
interpreted empiri-
cally
since in the sphere of the philosophy of reality, they must necessarily
manifest themselves empirically)» (italics original) (Id.,
Einleitung
, cit., pp.
CXIV-CXVI). Already Flint had referred to this state of affairs by speaking of
«the tracing and testing of the ideas» (Id.,
Vico
, cit., p. 193).
184
G. Capograssi captured this cognitive direction by describing it as «il
tormento di Vico […] di scoprire l’idea nascosta nel reale (the strenuous effort
by Vico […] to discover the idea hidden in reality)» (As quoted in F. Lomona-
co,
Ragione e diritto prima delle Scienze nuove
, in
Razionalità e modernità in Vico
, cit.,
pp. 79-95, p. 83, footnote 13).
185
Philosophy
, Chapter 16, § 1; similarly Chapter 17, § 1. This is of course
not the only fundamental insight that Vico arrived at and built into his philo-
sophical edifice. This is also not to claim originality or uniqueness when the
history of ideas clearly indicates otherwise, and as was acknowledged by Vico
himself. We are concerned mainly with Vico’s own (theorized) mode of
thought without dwelling on his indebtedness to other (Renaissance and early
modern) thinkers, which has been, and continues to be, fruitfully explored by
intellectual historians. This is true also with respect to the historical develop-
ments in the field of philology. Its historically changing conception and prac-
tice that were in the background of Vico’s reflections, are traced, for example