233 / 298
Vico’s Ring
233
there existed a true good] for at first sight it seemed ill-advised to risk the loss
of what was certain in the hope of something at that time uncertain» (§ 2); «I
therefore debated whether it might be possible to arrive at a new guiding
principle – or at least the sure hope of its attainment (
ad ipsius certitudinem per-
venire
) – without changing the manner and normal routine of my life» (§ 3).
«But after a little reflection, I first of all realised that if I abandoned the old
ways [the pursuit of riches, honour, and sensual pleasure] and embarked on a
new way of life, I should be abandoning a good that was by its very nature
uncertain […] in favor of one that was uncertain not of its own nature (for I
was seeking a permanent good) but only in respect to its attainment» (§ 6). See
the insightful commentary in P.-F. Moreau,
Spinoza. L’expérience et l’éternité
, cit.,
pp. 65-103, including the contrast with «uncertain» in the sense of
vana et futilia
(futile and in vain) (
ibid.
, p. 69), and Spinoza’s and Descartes’ concept of «cer-
tain» (
ibid.
, pp. 94-103), analogous to the contrast between «epistemological»
(Cartesian) and «anthropological» (Spinozan) (
ibid.
, pp. 97-101).
453
TTP
, p. 90, second paragraph to p. 93, second paragraph (inclusive),
ending on p. 94.
454
He clearly introduces this task by saying: «Now when we possess this
historical account of Scripture […], it will now be time to embark on the task
of investigating the meaning of the prophets and the Holy Spirit» (
TTP
, p.
90
).
455
Ibid.
, p. 90; italics added.
456
Ethics
, Part II, specifically Propositions XXXVII-XL.
457
Ibid.
, Part II, Proposition XXXVIII.
458
Garrett commented that «[a]dequacy is one of Spinoza’s most im-
portant concepts» (Id.,
Meaning in Spinoza’s Method
, cit., p. 52; see also his dis-
cussion
ibid.
, pp. 52-55). Similarly, Deleuze emphasized: «Les notions com-
munes sont une des découvertes fondamentales de l’
Ethique
(The common
notions are one of the fundamental discoveries of the
Ethics
)» (Id.,
Spinoza et le
problème de l‘expression
, cit., p. 271). He also points out their being imbedded in
Spinoza’s overall philosophy: «C’est pourquoi les notions communes nous
font connaitre l’ordre positif de la Nature […]. C’est cet ordre de la nature qui
exprime Dieu comme source, et plus nous connaissons les choses suivant cet
ordre, plus nos idées elles-mêmes expriment Dieu, quand elle est dirigée par
les notions communes. […] Commun ne signifie plus general, c’est-à-dire ap-
plicable à plusieurs modes existants ou à tous les modes existants d’un certain
genre. Commun signifie univoque: l’attribut est univoque, ou commun à Dieu
dont il constitue l’essence singulière et aux modes dont il contient les essences
particulières (This is why the common notions let us know the true order of
Nature […]. It is the order of Nature that expresses God as the source; and