Table of Contents Table of Contents
Previous Page  230 / 298 Next Page
Information
Show Menu
Previous Page 230 / 298 Next Page
Page Background

Horst Steinke

230

435

Preus described the commonality between Bacon and Spinoza as fol-

lows: «Like Bacon, Spinoza takes a bottoms-up approach that begins with the

data, in this case all relevant factual information needed as a foundation for

understanding the Bible – its language, its authors and their context; the histo-

ry of its composition, editing, reception, text transmission, etc.» (Id.,

Spinoza

and the Irrelevance of Biblical Authority

, cit., p. 164). As we are trying to point out,

the «bottoms-up approach» as such, attributed both to Bacon and Spinoza, is

more complex than the term might suggest, on the one hand, and, more sig-

nificantly, is motivated by, and implemented in, non-comparable philosophi-

cal/scientific frameworks, on the other hand.

436

Theory-ladenness is the subject of J. Hintikka,

Inquiry as Inquiry: A Logic

of Scientific Discovery,

Dordrecht-Boston-London, Kluwer Academic, 1999, pp.

241-250.

437

The pointedness of this statement, and others, is reflective of his radi-

cal disagreement with Lodewijk Meyer on the fundamental relation of Scrip-

ture and philosophy, notwithstanding their agreement on secondary aspects.

438

We will have to keep on reading Chapter 7 to realize that under «mean-

ing», Spinoza subsumes a specific characterization, and well-defined content,

as discussed below.

439

This seems to be the position of Preus: «[…] Spinoza distinguishes the

question of truth from that of meaning. That distinction and the dialectical

relation between the two operations (

interpreting texts

and

making truth judgments

)

is the most fundamental principle of his whole method, and is inseparable

from his claim that his method is historical, not philosophical» (Id.,

Spinoza

and the Irrelevance of Biblical Authority

, cit., p. 200; italics added).

440

Reventlow explained: «By “meaning” is understood solely the state-

ments set down by the authors in the texts, […], while the absolute truth

alone is to be transmitted through philosophical speculation […]» (Id.,

History

of Biblical Interpretation

, vol. 4, cit., p. 100). Legaspi, also, sees Spinoza’s refer-

ences to «truth» as imbued with philosophical value, by way of contrast with

the content of Scripture: «The discovery of what is “true” is a crucial element

of Spinoza’s biblical criticism. The quest to discover what is true in and of the

Bible is not, for Spinoza, a metaphysical one. He does not seek, by his philo-

logical inquiries, to discover the sense in which the Bible itself contains Truth

or offers metaphysical precepts that are ratified by reason and experience»

(Id.,

The Death of Scripture and the Rise of Biblical Studies

, cit., p. 24).

441

For this “model-theoretic” perspective, see W. Hodges,

Model Theory

, in

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

(Fall 2013 Edition), ed. by W. N. Zalta,

online at

<www.plato.stanford.edu

>.