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Horst Steinke
46
for the fundamental terms introduced as deliberate. In the words
of Mark,
Spinoza’s purpose in the
Ethics
is not to discover new facts, but to pre-
sent conclusions which he believes to follow from general principles.
[…] For if the premises are granted and if the axiomatic method is cor-
rectly applied, then Spinoza is perfectly right that one cannot rationally
refuse to grant the conclusions as well
97
.
Spinoza, it seems, had in mind expounding on foundational
matters in another work, entitled
Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione
(
TdIE
)
98
.
Despite the fact that this description of the formal character
of Spinoza’s
Ethics
is broad-brushed, it should provide a sense of
its overriding characteristic which is its deductive logic. This then
will be our conceptual “template” against which to compare Vi-
co’s “Elements”; in other words, do the “Elements” with their
language of axioms
99
, definitions, propositions, postulates, prin-
ciples, corollaries, constitute such a deductive system also, as one
might reasonably expect by this terminology? In Vico studies,
this is anything but a new question, and we will simply draw on
some of the results that seem to be most pertinent, rather than
examine the question anew
100
. E. McMullin, for example, sub-
jected Vico’s “Elements” to tests in terms of various types of
reasoning and logic (“axiomatic”, “inductive“, “retroductive”)
101
by themselves, and in combination. Leaving aside all complexi-
ties and subtleties, the fundamental insight is unavoidable:
«Though Vico uses deductivist language constantly, the infer-
ences he makes are not really deductive most of the time. When
he says “from this axiom it follows […]” , or “this axiom proves
[…]”, the inference is usually far from a straight-line deductive
one»
102
. To illustrate, Axioms LVIII (§ 228) and LIX (§§ 229-
230) read: