Vico’s Ring
45
From our point of view, in any case, the key point is Spino-
za’s own motivation and conviction in casting his most im-
portant work in
mos geometrico
, which was his belief in the truth-
fulness and truth-generating power of deductive logic. Today his
success in carrying out his project may be a subject for debate
but he personally was absolutely convinced of its supreme epis-
temological status
90
.
It is therefore not surprising that the
tool
of correct, truth-
preserving reason(ing) itself became an
object
91
of concern when
varying conceptions of the stock-in-trade of the geometric
method came into use. A case in point is Spinoza’s friend,
Lodewijk Meyer, who wrote the Preface to Spinoza’s
Principles of
Descartes’ Philosophy
92
.
In it Meyer outlines his views of the key
parts of the geometric method, namely, definitions, postulates,
and axioms. A comparison with Spinoza’s own exposition and
use of these concepts, however, indicates differences of under-
standing, and Spinoza was drawn into defending his propositions
at a meta-level, as obviously truth-preservation would be in jeop-
ardy if the meaning and function of definitions, axioms, and pos-
tulates were to become indeterminate
93
.
As stated above, a second essential part of deductive logic are
the premises or initial assumptions on the basis of which deduc-
tive reasoning can do its work
94
. How does
Ethics
deal with this
requirement? The surprising answer – considering the philosoph-
ical stature of
Ethics
– is that the establishment of such first prin-
ciples is not found in the work. Spinoza studies have examined
this lacuna from different points of view. According to one view,
an explicit exposition of such underlying principles was unneces-
sary since
Ethics
as a whole makes clear how the most fundamen-
tal terms need to be understood
95
. Others, however, find this ex-
planation problematic as it could be branded as circularity
96
. It is
far more in keeping with Spinoza’s grand philosophical project
to view the absence and omission of a fully-developed rationale