Horst Steinke
42
from premise to conclusion»
75
, it is difficult to see how
Ethics
could measure up to this standard. We will just give the follow-
ing example, on Spinoza’s characterization of “good”
76
. As can
be seen, the individual statements that need to be related are
scattered across Parts IV and V in different contexts, and thus
fail, on the face of it, to constitute a “linear” step-by-step deduc-
tive chain
77
:
1.
Part IV, Definition 1: «By
good
I mean that which we cer-
tainly know to be useful to us»;
2.
Part IV, Proposition VIII, Proof: «We call a thing good
or evil, when it is of service or the reverse in preserving our be-
ing, that is, when it increases or diminishes, helps of hinders, our
power of activity»;
3.
Part IV, Proposition XXXVIII: «
Whatsoever disposes the
human body, so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased num-
ber of ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways, is
useful to man
»;
4.
Part IV, Proposition XX: «
The more every man endeavors, and
is able to seek what is useful to him – in other words, to preserve his own
being – the more is he endowed with virtue
»;
5.
Part IV, Definition VIII: «By
virtue
(
virtus
) and
power
I
mean the same thing; […] in so far as it has the power of effect-
ing what can only be understood by the laws of that nature»;
6.
Part V, Definition II: «I say that we
act
when anything
takes place, either within us or externally to us, whereof we are
the adequate cause».
Upon closer scrutiny, it cannot escape that in addition to the
use of elementary logic –
if
something increases our power of
acting,
then
it is good,
else
it is evil –, a wealth of new factors and
concepts is injected into the exposition of what is
good
:
useful
,
pow-
er
,
acting
,
virtue
,
laws
,
nature
,
adequate
,
cause
,
to name a few. These
are all highly complex concepts in their own right, and their in-
troduction in the line of reasoning bursts the confines of a purely
deductive system
78
. So, on this way of reading,
Ethics
should not