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Horst Steinke

50

approach to geometrical manipulations. With respect to the tri-

angle,

Ethics

says, for example: «The affects [emotions like dejec-

tion, pride, envy] follow as necessarily from the said emotions, as

it follows from the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are

equal to two right angles»

118

.

To briefly summarize the above discussion, there are then two

different aspects to the use of “geometry” in both Spinoza and

Vico. To restate the aspect that was just pointed out, for Spino-

za, geometrical constructions and the way such constructions are

arrived at, were imbued with metaphysical significance. Far from

being an idiosyncratic, mystical view of phenomena, the inter-

connections between geometry and higher level structures were

for Spinoza part and parcel of a single and unified (monist) reali-

ty. The same cannot be said for Vico who accorded geometry,

together with “arithmetic” forming mathematics, a key position

in his theory of knowledge, but also insisting on its conditions of

possibility, boundaries, and epistemological separateness, both

with respect to metaphysics and physical reality

119

.

The other aspect which has been dealt with in greater detail

above because it bears a more direct relationship to the literary

structure of Vico’s “Elements”, is the

geometric method /deductive

logic

. Spinoza’s

Ethics

can be seen as having, by design, as points

of departure, terms of reference in vogue at the time; the work is

not devoted to re-invent these concepts in a fresh foundational

framework, but rather, for argument’s sake assume them as giv-

en

120

, and take them to their logical conclusion

121

. Set against this

structural characteristic of

Ethics

, the contrast with Vico’s “Ele-

ments” becomes evident: it is not inferences from already known

first principles that Vico is preoccupied with, but the discovery

and enunciation of such first principles in the first place

122

. These

“axioms” or

degnità

, in fact, have every right to be called “ele-

ments” in the formal sense of fundamental constituents rather

than merely derived, subordinate components, perhaps even

more so than the products of deductive logic

123

.