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This argument goes further (or perhaps better said, in a different direc-
tion) than Maull: «Spinoza’s message […] is that experiments (because they
admit to different interpretations) decide no unique hypothesis and that a me-
chanical hypothesis […] may only be justified by rigid mathematical proof
from higher principles» (Id.,
Spinoza in the Century of Science
, cit., p. 6). By «rea-
son», Spinoza did not have in mind a form of mathematical physics. A side
glance at the (modern) history of Spinoza reception shows that this tendency
has not always been resisted. Maull acknowledged that «[i]t has become com-
monplace […] to mention a conceptual link between elements of Spinoza’s
physical theory and rather more recent scientific notions – comparison with
potential energy, with fields of force, and even geometrodynamics», (
ibid.
, p.
12); see also A. Gabbey,
Spinoza’s natural science and methodology
, cit., p. 183,
endnote 6, calling such notions «bizarre meditations» and «surreal diachronic
assignations». The best known case-in-point, of course, may be Einstein, giv-
en his professed Spinozism, about whom P. Pesic noted: «At a critical mo-
ment he invoked Spinoza to justify his opposition to quantum theory in the
name of rigorous determinism» (Id.,
Einstein and Spinoza: Determinism and Identi-
cality Reconsidered
, in «Studia Spinozana», 12, 1996, pp. 195-202, p. 195; see also
D. Home - A. Robinson,
Einstein and Tagore: Man, Nature and Mysticism
, in
«Journal of Consciousness Studies», 2, 1995, 2, pp. 167-179). Perhaps it was
also due to his reception or arguably “overinterpretation” of Spinoza that
Einstein conceived other entities in physics in certain ways, such as space –
not as a structural component, but as the all-embracing entity whose geometry
underlies forces and matter – and maybe also his predilection for oxymoronic
“thought experiments” (
Gedankenexperimente
) could be traced back to an (idio-
syncratic) reception and interpretation of the isomorphism of God-Nature
and Mind that are central themes in
Ethics.
According to Wilson, «[…]
thought is coextensive with materiality according to Spinoza […]» (Id.,
Spino-
za’s theory of knowledge
, cit., p. 115).
On the other hand, Peterman salutarily noted, with respect to Spinoza’s
discussion of extension, motion, and rest in
Ethics
– labelled in Spinoza stud-
ies as “physical digression” or “physical interlude” – that seems to have given
rise to much of modern “philosophical-scientific” speculation: «Given that
Spinoza does not provide the definition of motion and extension, we might
wonder to what extent we should even treat the interlude as specifically
physi-
cal
» (Id.,
Spinoza on Physical Science
, cit., p. 219; italics original).
524
Nadler gave the following example of commonalities rooted in Spino-
za’s epistemic system as well as ontology (kept separate here for expository
purposes): «[…] such essences [of natural phenomena] are the equivalent