Horst Steinke, Vico’s Ring. Notes on the“Scienza nuova”, its Structure, and the Hermeneutics of Homer’s Works

Horst Steinke

248

ous body, not heterogeneous». Simonutti commented: «Il filosofo olandese

non propone, quindi, un ragionamento fondato su una procedura fisico-

sperimentale, ma procede nella fondazione razionale dei principi della meta-

fisica per affermare la necessità dell’esistenza della materia che egli dimostra

essere, oltre che infinita, necessariamente estesa e omogenea in tutte le sue

componenti (The Dutch philosopher does not propose, therefore, scientific

reasoning based on a physical-experimental procedure, but proceeds to the

rational foundation of the principles of metaphysics by positing the existence

of matter that he demonstrates, apart from being infinite, to be necessarily

extended and homogeneous in all its parts)» (Id.,

Dalle “sensate esperienze”

all’ermeneutica biblica

cit

, p. 319). Simonutti makes reference to

Ethics

, Part I,

Proposition 15, Proof, and Note.

517

There were in the end personal, and very human, consequences, as Si-

monutti related: «Gli sforzi del Segretario della Royal Society non riuscirono

tuttavia a impedire il raffreddamento dei rapporti di Spinoza con i due amici

inglesi […] (The efforts of the Royal Society secretary were nevertheless una-

ble to prevent the cooling of the relationship between Spinoza and his two

English friends […])» (

ibid.

, p. 325).

518

Maull raised the question: «Why, given Spinoza’s apparent interest in

experiment, is he so estranged from it philosophically?» (Id.,

Spinoza in the Cen-

tury of Science

, cit., p. 7). In our view, he integrated empirical research philo-

sophically under the rubric of the first kind of knowledge, and his skepticism

and questioning of experimental results is thus profoundly philosophically

motivated and (formally) justified.

519

Simonutti described Boyle’s intentions as follows: «Cimentandosi in uno

dei primi tentativi di analisi autonoma dei fenomeni chimici e fisiologici, Boyle

vuole dimostrare la validità della scienza sperimentale sotto il profilo conoscitivo

(By engaging in one of the first attempts of autonomous analyses of chemical

and physiological phenomena, Boyle wanted to demonstrate the validity of

experimental science as part of the epistemic enterprise)» (Id.,

Dalle “sensate

esperienze” all’ermeneutica biblica

cit

, p. 316).

520

For Spinoza’s differences with Bacon, see A. V. Garrett,

Meaning in Spi-

noza’s Method

, cit., pp. 77-81, discussing Spinoza’s reference to Bacon in

Letter

; A. Gabbey,

Spinoza’s natural science and methodology

, cit., pp. 170-176, discuss-

ing Bacon’s and Spinoza’s

experientia vaga

, and concluding (nomenclature add-

ed): «The difference here between Bacon and Spinoza is that for Bacon

experi-

entia vaga

is an ineffectual

method

of finding the causes of things: for Spinoza it

is [1

kind of knowledge:] an

empirical base of a specific logical kind

from which

kind:] are inferred general propositions which are useful in life but which