Horst Steinke, Vico’s Ring. Notes on the“Scienza nuova”, its Structure, and the Hermeneutics of Homer’s Works

253

10.

VICO’S INTERPRETATIVE FRAMEWORK

OF THE HOMERIC WORKS

The task we have set ourselves – relating Vico to Spinoza’s

hermeneutics – is challenging and problematic insofar as it must

start from the recognition that the fundamental epistemic objec-

tives these great thinkers pursued diverged in radical ways. If

these essential aims are deemed incommensurable, it poses diffi-

culties with respect to correctly relating the terminology and

concepts used by virtue of their apparent similarity or even iden-

tity. The preceding sketch of Spinoza’s hermeneutics in the form

of his biblical-criticism/historical-criticism was meant to identify,

perhaps at the price of oversimplification, his overriding objec-

tive. This objective, as argued, consisted of the demarcation of

two epistemic levels: the level of «meaning» belonging to the

“second kind of knowledge” vs. the higher plane of «truth», ac-

cessible only through the “third kind of knowledge”, «scientia in-

tuitiva». As has been pointed out above, Spinoza had a special

connotation in mind with reference to «meaning» of Scripture,

namely, an instance of «common notions» in the ontology of

Ethics

, consisting of the recognition of God-Nature, and the

mandate to «love […] neighbors as themselves»

534

. Not to put

too fine a point on it, by implication, everything else in Scripture

is relegated to a subaltern role, a fact that Spinoza candidly ex-

pressed earlier in

TTP

(nomenclature added):

If we now consider the nature of the natural Divine Law, […], we shall

see:

1. […]

2. That it does not demand [2

kind of knowledge:] belief in historical

narratives (

fidem historiarum

) of any kind whatsoever. […] Nor can [2