Horst Steinke
68
customs and laws, […] their wars, peaces, alliances, travels, and com-
merce (italics added).
In order to remain consistent with the recognition of the deep
juridical roots of Vico’s thought, it behooves us to again bring
Diritto universale
into the discussion, especially since the two Parts
of Book II, entitled
De constantia iurisprudentiae
(
On the Constancy of
the Jurisprudent
)
127
prominently feature the two expressions, both
in their titles and contents: the First Part,
De Constantia philoso-
phiae
(
On the Constancy of Philosophy
;
Philosophy
for short)
128
, and the
Second Part,
De Constantia philologiae
(
On the Constancy of Philology
;
Philology
for short)
129
.
In the broadest terms,
Philosophy
lays down “theological” and
philosophical foundations for the rule of law, but it is incumbent
to note the specific ways(s) in which Vico does so in order to
trace, and keep track of, the “red thread”
130
that runs from
Diritto
universale
to
Scienza nuova.
It is actually the very first chapter, in
fact, even the chapter heading, that declares the parameters of
his “philosophical” agenda: «a correct consciousness of one’s
own nature», which is then further described (Chapter 1, § 1) as
«knowledge of our nature, that is, to know, to will, and to be able
to do»
131
. Thus Vico is highly selective in his anthropology; in the
ensuing multifaceted discussion, he never strays far from these
three basic constituents, «to know» (i.e. the human mind), «to
will» (i.e. free will), and «to be able to do» (i.e. through the body).
As point of departure for grasping the full meaning of these es-
sential human characteristics, Vico holds up «Adam before the
fall» attributing to him the possession of «a pure mind» (Chapter
4, §§ 3-6). Such purity of mind included being free from the er-
rors induced by the senses and passions, on the one hand, and
displaying true piety («love toward God»), on the other hand, ex-
pressed in a life devoted to truth and love of all people, treating
the elderly as one would treat one’s parents, peers as one’s own
siblings, younger ones as one’s own children. For Vico, the state
of the human mind was not merely intellectuality but directly as-