Vico’s Ring
79
often horrendous – gap between profession and practice in Christianity
(Chapter 16, § 3).
136
R. Ruggiero commented: «Gli ultimi due
capitoli
del
De constantia philoso-
phiae
sono quelli con un più spiccato orientamento giuridico (The last two
chapters
of
On the Constancy of Philosophy
are those with a stronger juridical orien-
tation)» (Id.,
Nova Scientia Tentatur
, cit., p. 139). In our review, the expressly
juridical topicality at the end of
Philosophy
encompasses Chapters 16 to 20, not
only Chapters 19 and 20.
Overall,
Philosophy
can be subdivided into three distinct, but interconnect-
ed sections: (1) “Metaphysical Doctrine” (Chapters 3-7); (2) “Moral Doctrine”
(Chapters 8-15); (3) “Civil Doctrine/Jurisprudence” (Chapters 16-20). In each
section, Vico methodically goes about making his case with respect to, and in
the order of, (a) the «Christian religion», (b) Plato, (c) the Stoics, and (d) Epi-
curus, resp. The only obvious departure from this pattern is the lack of explic-
it mention of the Stoics in the final section. Vico’s glowing portrayal of the
«Christian religion» has much of the hallmarks of a projection of his own
cherished ideas, which is apparent when he quotes from Scripture out of con-
text.
137
Term used in Chapter 17, § 3.
138
Indirectly, by way of reference to A. Vinnius (1588-1657), see R. Rug-
giero,
Nova Scientia Tentatur
, cit., p. 139.
139
There are 114 Axioms in total, but obviously they cannot be dealt with
here
in toto.
140
While the Axiom refers to “philology”, it is made at a meta-level, which
can be seen also in the case of other Axioms, such as Axiom VII (§ 132):
«Legislation considers man as he is in order to turn him to good use in human
society». Such meta-level statements properly belong to the sphere of “philos-
ophy”. In fact, in Axiom XXII (§ 163), Vico explains that the first 15 Axioms
«give us the foundations of the true», using the term
true
, as usual, for the sub-
ject and content of his “philosophy”.
141
Ruggiero places Vico’s staking out of the territory of his “philology” in
the context of the intellectual ferment of the 17
th
and 18
th
centuries; see Id.,
Nova Scientia Tentatur
, cit., pp. 147-151. He commented: «Nell’età di Vico,
dunque […] siamo di fronte ad un momento di passaggio epocale nello
sviluppo del metodo filologico e di ciò che più in generale voglia dire “filolo-
gia”» (In Vico’s age, we are therefore confronted with a time of sea change in
the development of the philological method and of what more generally is
meant by “philology”»)» (
ibid.
, p. 147). This agrees with A. Battistini who ob-
served: «The Vichian definition of philology infinitely expands the meaning it