59 / 298
Vico’s Ring
59
88
A significant recent example of such a state of affairs is the proof of the
Poincaré Conjecture by G. Perelman (2002), about which I. Stewart observed:
«The preprints […] did not include full details […]. So the experts had to re-
construct a certain amount of Perelman’s thinking» (Id.,
Visions of Infinity
, cit.,
p. 199).
89
As has been demonstrated by M. Hooker,
The Deductive Character of Spi-
noza’s Metaphysics
, in
Philosopy of Baruch Spinoza
, cit., pp. 17-34.
90
This is also shown by the fact of the utmost sincerity of his belief in the
logico-geometric method as a panacea for both social issues and human psy-
chology. As Shmueli,
The Geometrical Method, Personal Caution, and the Idea of Tol-
erance
, cit., p. 209, wrote, «the geometrical method served for Spinoza […] as a
device for restraining his strong temper when dealing with views whose
treatment by him might have annoyed the public». According to Shmueli,
Eth-
ics
itself provides an example of Spinoza’s internal struggles when he lets
come to the surface barely controlled animus (at the end of the work, in
Eth-
ics,
Part V, Proposition XLI, Note), by describing «the general belief of the
multitude» as «their feeble and infirm spirit» dominated chiefly by «the fear of
being horribly punished after death» (
ibid.
, p. 212). With respect to its role in
the socio-political realm, see Ch. Norris’ comment about it being above «all
the strife of competing creeds and ideologies» (Id.,
Spinoza & the Origins of
Modern Critical Theory
, cit., p. 31) Spinoza expected the geometrical method to
be the incontrovertible means of resolving disagreements; as Wolfson,
The
Geometrical Method
, cit., p. 99, wrote: «It was in order to avoid the need of argu-
ing against opponents». Our portrayal of Spinoza’s absolute commitment to
the geometrical method is at variance with the view espoused by Y.Yovel,
Spi-
noza and Other Heretics: The Marrano of Reason
, Princeton-Oxford, Princeton
University Press, 1989, p. 139: «The geometrical model […] is not as sacro-
sanct to Spinoza as is sometimes supposed, for it neither guarantees nor is
indispensable to the attainment of truth». Of course, the second part of the
statement is true by itself, but the argument presented here (and by other Spi-
noza readers) is that Spinoza took deductive logic, and only deductive logic,
correctly exercised, to be truth-preserving. The following comment by Mark is
pertinent here: «There is no need, then, to think that attributing to Spinoza a
recognition of the truth-preserving character of the axiomatic method in-
volves attributing to him the (false) belief that whatever is presented in axio-
matic form is thereby true» (Id.,
Ordine Geometrica Demonstrata,
cit., p. 273).
91
For a historical perspective, see A. V. Garrett,
Meaning in Spinoza’s Meth-
od
, cit., pp. 74-76.
92
Ibid.
, p. 15, footnote 25; pp. 115-117.