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Horst Steinke
208
knowledge, thus following through on the initially proposed two-
fold objective, «to deduce by logical inference the meaning of the
authors of Scripture»
454
. Again he reiterates the imperative of fol-
lowing the exemplary method of «interpreting Nature». While he
had left such method unexplained in the introduction, except in
terms of «deduc[ing] the definitions of things of Nature», in the
present section these «definitions» are now more concretely de-
scribed as «those features which are most
universal
and
common
(
res
maxime universales et toti naturae communes
)»
455
. For Spinoza,
common
notions
have a specified place or role in his epistemic architecture,
being the subject of a number of Propositions in
Ethics
456
. The
fundamental point is that there are correct (“adequate”, in Spi-
noza’s terminology) ideas about the properties that are common
to all human beings, and human minds, the paradigmatic exam-
ple he gives in this connection in
TTP
is the property of motion-
and-rest in Nature. Spinoza, however, places conditions on the
nature and scope of the term
common
by stipulating that they
«cannot be conceived except adequately»
457
. What Spinoza means
by being «adequate»
458
in this context, is explained in Proposition
XL: «For when we say that an idea in the human mind follows
from ideas which are therein adequate, we say, in other words,
that an idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause,
[…] in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind».
Thus, the correct, adequate understanding of common notions is
ultimately dependent on, or to be validated by, the «divine intel-
lect» which is synonymous with intuitive knowledge, the third
kind of knowledge.
Universality
, used synonymously by Spinoza
for what is
common
, therefore, also cannot be isolated from idio-
syncratic Spinozan nuances; it reflects infinite modes of God-
Nature
459
instead of merely, or solely, denoting “garden-variety”
generality and/or consistency
460
.
This is the subtext according to which Spinoza’s dictum to
«first seek from our study of Scriptures that which is most uni-
versal and forms the basis and foundation of all Scriptures»
461