181 / 298
Vico’s Ring
181
that he was aware of the difficulties in which his theory of language involved
him».
374
TTP
, Chapter 7, p. 98.
375
To the above quoted statement, Spinoza added the comment: «Nor
need we enquire into the author’s life […], the language in which he wrote,
and for whom and when, nor what happened to his book, nor its different
readings […]» (
ibid.
, p. 98). He also takes the opportunity to make clear what
the “geometrical method” meant to him: «For the nature and virtue of that
light [of reason] consists essentially in this, that by a process of logical deduc-
tion that which is hidden is inferred and concluded from what is known, or
given as known» (
ibid.
, p. 99).
376
This conclusion is the opposite of Parkinson, p. 94, referring to the
same statement: «This clearly implies that propositions which are examples of
the second kind of knowledge can be expressed in linguistic terms».
377
The Euclidean logic resources are fully exploited, for example, in
Proposition XIII, making use of the logical tropes of
propositio, demonstratio,
corollarium, axioma, lemma, definitio,
and
postulata.
But there is also a concession
to “language” in the form of the «Note (
scholium
)», which by its being set apart
and written in a “conversational” style, highlights the core formal exposition
all the more; the same could be said, mutatis mutandis, of other “informal”
parts of
Ethics
, such as the “Prefaces” and “Appendices”,
pace
Vitiello: «Non
sempre Spinoza appare convinto dell’adeguatezza del
mos geometricon
, se nella
stessa
Ethica
, in luoghi fondamentali, abbandona “il prolisso ordine geome-
trico” […], come nelle Appendici delle Parti I e IV, e nelle Prefazioni delle
Parti II, IV e V (Spinoza does not always appear convinced of the adequacy of
the
mos geometrico
, given that in
Ethics
itself, in fundamental places, he abandons
“the long-winded geometrical method” […], as in the Appendices of Parts I
and IV, and in the Prefaces of Parts II, IV, and V)» (Id.,
Saggio introduttivo
,
cit.,
pp. VI-CLXXII, p. LXVII). Kennington is another reader who finds the two
forms of exposition present in
Ethics
in need of assimilation: «In the
Ethics
the
surface contradiction lies between the geometric form of exposition and the
abandonment of the form, especially in Part II. […] Instead he [Spinoza] blurs
in various ways […] the limitation of the geometric and the introduction of
the new method in II» (Id.,
Analytic and Synthetic Methods in Spinoza’s
Ethics, in
The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza
, cit., pp. 293-318, p. 308). However, G. Deleuze
emphasizes, for different reasons from ours, the disjunction between the for-
mal propositions of
Ethics
and the informal
scholia
(“Notes”): «En virtu de leur
indépendence à l’égard des propositions qu’ils doublent, on dirait que l’
Ethique
a été simultanément écrite deux fois, sur deux tons, sur un double register (By
virtue of its independence with regard to the propositions which they accom-